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ABSTRACT
Access control is an important component of any database
management system. Several access control models have
been proposed for conventional databases. However, these
models do not seem adequate for geographical databases,
due to the peculiarities of geographical data. Previous work
on access control models for geographical data mainly con-
cerns raster maps (images). In this paper, we present a
discretionary access control model for geographical maps.
We assume that each map is composed of a set of features.
Each feature is represented in one or more maps by spatial
objects, described by means of diﬀerent spatial properties:
geometric properties, describing the shape, extension and lo-
cation of the objects, and topological properties, describing
the topological relationships existing among objects. The
proposed access control model allows the security adminis-
trator to deﬁne authorizations against map objects at a very
ﬁne granularity level, taking into account the various spatial
representations and the object dimension. The model also
supports both positive and negative authorizations as well
as diﬀerent propagation rules that make access control very
ﬂexible.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—
spatial databases and GIS
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1. INTRODUCTION
Geographical data have a strategic relevance in a large
variety of contexts, like homeland security, marketing anal-
ysis tools and environmental risks control procedures. Most
applications in these areas require a ﬁne-granularity ﬂexi-
ble access control to geographical information. A possible
naive approach to support access control is to build ad hoc
datasets (maps) for each type of access the administrator
wants to grant: this has been the cartographic approach ap-
plied for many years in the past. Such an approach is not
suitable when the user community is large and dynamic -
which is today often the case in Web-based systems. More-
over, such an approach does not support ﬂexible protec-
tion granularities and dynamic changes in the access control
policies. The introduction of integrated GIS systems, char-
acterized by high level comprehensive data models, is today
making possible the development of advanced access control
models which go beyond such naive approach. However,
despite the importance of data protection, no eﬀorts have
been devoted to the investigation of access control models
and systems for GIS.
Several access control models have been proposed for con-
ventional database systems. However, these models are not
adequate for geographical databases, because of the pecu-
liarities of geographical maps. Objects in these maps can be
represented with diﬀerent dimensions and the accesses can
also be driven by the reference space (i.e., authorization to
access only data concerning geographical entities in a given
region). Moreover, geographical data can be represented us-
ing diﬀerent approaches. The users of a GIS system usually
recognize geographical data from the existence of a geom-
etry describing the shape, extension and location of some
geographical objects (features). However, geographical data
can be represented also in other forms, for example by using
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a set of topological relations (topological representation),
that specify the adiacency, the disjointness or other kind of
interaction between two features. Those various representa-
tions should be taken into account when deﬁning an access
control model.
Previous work on access control models for geographical
data has mainly dealt with raster maps (images) [1], focus-
ing on conﬁdentiality for sensible information that can be
revealed by high resolution image satellites. In such model,
each protected object is basically an image or portion of an
image. Thus, the model supports neither the vector-based
representation of features nor the topological one. As such,
the model is not adequate for usage in current GIS and spa-
tial DBMS. Moreover, it only deals with read privileges and
it is thus not adequate for dynamic applications requiring
data modiﬁcations. In [5, 4], an extension of the classical
discretionary access control model is proposed to protect
vector-based spatial data against requests issued through a
Web service. In such a proposal, spatial data consist of ob-
jects having a geometry compliant with the OpenGIS simple
features model [3]. In the proposed access control model,
authorizations on spatial objects can be applied on limited
areas (windows) within the reference space. As an example,
a user may be authorized to insert road objects only if the
roads are located in a well deﬁned region. Windows deﬁne
the geographical scope of authorizations, thus making au-
thorizations themselves geographical objects which occupy
a position in the reference space.
In this paper, we present an access control model for geo-
graphical maps, admitting multiple (vector-based and topo-
logical) representations. We assume maps to be represented
according to the Layered Spatial Data Model (LSDM) [2].
Such model is based on the concept of feature type. Exam-
ples of feature types are roads, lakes, and so on. Each map
contains various instances of the feature types (several roads,
several lakes, and so on), each represented with a given di-
mension (0 if they are represented as points, 1 if they are
lines, 2 if they are represented as regions). Each speciﬁc
feature is associated inside a map with at least one spatial
representation (geometric or topological). LSDM provides a
query language that allows one to express complex queries
on the maps and features of an LSDM database instance. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the only data model that
provides representation and query capabilities for objects
with multiple spatial representations. The LSDM model
and language thus represent the right context for deﬁning a
general enough access control mechanism.
The proposed access control model takes into account sev-
eral requirements previously discussed. It allows one to spec-
ify authorizations against map objects at a very ﬁne gran-
ularity level. It also takes into account the various spatial
representations and the object dimension. For example, un-
der the proposed model, the administrator can authorize a
user to see a given object at 0 dimension and not at higher
dimensions, thus hiding detailed information about the ob-
ject shape. The model also supports both positive autho-
rizations, giving permissions, and negative authorizations,
specifying denials, as well as various propagation rules mak-
ing access control very ﬂexible. Moreover, similarly to [5],
the model supports the concept of authorization window,
specifying the region of space in which the authorization
applies.
Since there are some similarities between the model
adopted for spatial data and the typical object-oriented data
models, in order to develop our access control model we
took into account access control models proposed for object-
oriented databases [6, 10, 11]. In particular, we borrowed
the concepts of weak and strong authorizations from the au-
thorization model of Orion [10]. In Orion, an authorization
is strong if it, and any authorization it implies, cannot be
overridden by other authorizations. By contrast, authoriza-
tions implied by a weak authorization can be overridden.
With respect to the Orion model, spatial data require more
sophisticated propagation mechanisms like the type of spa-
tial representation of the objects (geometric or topological)
or the dimensional level of their spatial representations.
The proposed access control model consistently diﬀers from
the one presented in [5, 4]. Indeed: (i) the map model is
more complex, providing multiple representations (geomet-
ric and topological) of the same map object and multiple
representations of the same feature; (ii) in [5, 4] propagation
is only allowed along application-dependent privilege hier-
archies; on the other hand, in our model propagation rules
constitute an invariant part of the access control model and
are deﬁned along object and privilege hierarchies; (iii) diﬀer-
ently from [5, 4], both positive and negative authorizations,
as well as a mechanism to deﬁne exceptions to propagated
authorizations, are supported.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy
present the adopted map data model. In Section 3 we deﬁne
the basic elements of the authorization model. Access con-
trol model and mechanisms are then presented in Sections
4 and 5. Finally, Section 6 presents some conclusions and
outlines future work.
2. TOPOLOGICAL SPATIAL DATA MODEL
In this paper we consider a modiﬁed version of the Layered
Spatial Data Model (LSDM) [2]. We call this model Topo-
logical Spatial Data Model (TSDM), since we keep only the
topological layer of LSDM beyond the geometric one. This
modiﬁcation allows us to simplify the deﬁnition of the access
control model without reducing signiﬁcantly its expressive
power.
In TSDM the schema of a spatial database can be deﬁned
as a set of feature types and a set of map types. A map type
is a set of feature types and a feature type can belong to
diﬀerent map types. Each feature type has some descriptive
attributes and one spatial attribute. The spatial attribute
of a feature type can be represented in diﬀerent maps with
diﬀerent dimensions. Formally, a spatial database schema
in TSDM can be deﬁned as follows.
Definition 1 (Spatial Database Schema). The
schema of a spatial database in TSDM is a 5-tuple S =
(E , n(), DomE(),M,Map()) where:
• E = {E1, ..., Ek} is a set of feature type identiﬁers.
• n : E → N is a function which deﬁnes the number
of attributes of each feature type Ei ∈ E . The j-th
attribute of Ei is denoted by Ei.aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n(Ei).
Each feature type Ei has an attribute called identiﬁer
denoted as Ei.a0
• DomE : E ×N → {Dnumber ,Dstring} is a partial func-
tion which deﬁnes the domain of each attribute.
• M = {M1, ..., Mh} is a set of map types.
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• Map : E ×M→ {−1, 0, 1, 2} is a total function which
deﬁnes if a feature type Ei belongs to a map type Mj.
In particular, if Map(Ei,Mj) = −1, the feature type
Ei does not belong to the map type Mj ; if
Map(Ei,Mj) ≥ 0, Ei belongs to Mj and the spatial
representation of Ei in Mj is: the set of isolated points
of the Euclidean plane (E2) if Map(Ei,Mj) = 0; the
set of simple polylines of E2 if Map(Ei,Mj) = 1; the
set of simple polygons of E2 if Map(Ei,Mj) = 2.
Feature and map types are also called schema objects. ✷
The fact that a feature type has one or more geometric
domains associated with it in diﬀerent map types does not
imply that a feature will have in the database a geometric
representation. Indeed, the spatial representation of a fea-
ture can exist in one or both the layers, that are available
in a map. We brieﬂy present these layers here (more details
can be found in [2]).
• Geometric layer (Dgeo): in this layer, shape and loca-
tion on the earth surface of features are represented.
Geometric values belong to one of the following sets:
the set of points in the Euclidean plane E2, the set
of simple connected or not connected polylines in E2,
and the set of simple polygons of E2 delimited by a
simple closed polyline or by a set of closed polylines
(not connected polygons).
• Topological layer (Dtopo): in this layer the spa-
tial properties of each feature are represented by
describing the topological relations of the feature
with other features of the map [9]. The reference
set of topological relations is {Disjoint, T ouch, In,
Contains, Equal, Cross,Overlap}. These relations
are binary, mutually exclusive (if one is true, the others
are false) and they are a reﬁnement of the well-known
set of topological relations proposed in [7].
Given a TSDM schema, a TSDM instance can be deﬁned
as follows.
Definition 2 (Spatial Database Instance). The in-
stance of a spatial database schema S = (E = {E1, ..., Ek}, n(),
DomE(),M = {M1, ...,Mh}, Map()) in TSDM is composed
of:
• A set of feature type extensions I(E) = {I(E1), ..., I(Ek)}.
Each feature e ∈ I(Ei) is a tuple belonging to the do-
main N ×DomE(Ei, 1) × ... ×DomE(Ei, n(Ei)). We
denote with Dft = {e.a0|e.ao ∈ I(E1)∪ ...∪I(Ek)} the
set of all feature identiﬁers.
• A set of map instances (or simply maps) I(M) =
{I(M1), ..., I(Mh)}. Each map I(Mj) is a set of tu-
ples: 〈f, geo, top〉 ∈ Dft×(Dgeo∪{⊥})×(Dtop∪{⊥}),
where ⊥ denotes a null value.
Each tuple is called map object. We denote the instance
of a schema S as I(S) = (I(E), I(M)). Map objects and
features are also called instances. Extensions of feature types
(feature sets) and extension of map types (maps) are also
called group objects to emphasize the fact that they have an
extension, i.e., a set of instances. ✷
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Figure 1: Top: Example of a geographical database:
the railway network of Lombardy. Bottom: Topo-
logical relations among the features of the Region
and the County feature types (in italics). A dou-
ble arrow represents a Touch relation, while a single
arrow represents a In relation.
Example 1. Consider a geographic database represent-
ing the territory of Lombardy (North Italy) and containing
its railways, its administrative areas and its counties; more-
over, the accidents on the railway network are registered in
the database. The TSDM schema contains four feature types
E = {Railway,Accident,Region,County}. and two map
typesM = {M rail, M admin}. The feature types Railway
and Accident belong to the map type M rail with dimension
1 and dimension 0, respectively. The feature types Region
and County belong to the map type M admin with dimen-
sion 2. Moreover, suppose that all feature types have an
attribute Name (a1) representing the feature name, and an
attribute N (a2) representing: the number of inhabitants for
Region and County, the number of tracks for Railway, and
the accident type for Accident.
An instance of this schema can contain for example: a
complete geometric representation of the Railway features
(and therefore, also a topological one, since the topological
representation can be inferred from the geometric one) (Fig.
1) and a topological representation of Region and County
features (Fig. 1). When an accident occurs, either a geomet-
ric representation (a point) can be inserted in the database
or a topological one, represented by an In relation between
the accident and the railway section where it occurred. ✷
In [2], a query language for TSDM has also been proposed.
It is an algebra with the following types of operators:
• Feature-based operators: they are applied to fea-
ture sets and produce feature sets; they are very simi-
lar to the operators of the relational algebra. Examples
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of feature based operators are traditional relational op-
erators like selection (σF (Ei)), projection (ΠX(Ei)),
Join (Ei ✶F Ej), and the usual set based operators
(union ∪, diﬀerence \, intersection ∩).
• Map-based operators: they are applied to maps and
produce new maps. Among them, we recall: map se-
lection (σMF (Mi)), that takes a map instance I(Mi)
and selects all the map elements satisfying a certain
formula F ; semi-join (Min
M
F Mj), that takes two map
instances I(Mi) and I(Mj) and returns a new map in-
stance containing all the elements of the ﬁrst map in-
stance related as speciﬁed in F to some element of the
second map instance; usual set based operators (union,
intersection, diﬀerence) can be applied on maps.
• Mixed operators: they are applied to maps and fea-
ture sets and produce either maps or sets of features.
Among them, we recall: mixed projection (Πxft(Mi)),
that takes a map instance I(Mi) and returns the set
of features with feature type ft contained in the map;
mixed join (Mi ✶
x
F Mj), that takes two map instances
I(Mi) and I(Mj) and returns a new set of features ob-
tained by combining together the features associated
with pairs of map elements, satisfying condition F .
Example 2. Consider Example 1. The following are ex-
amples of queries, the ﬁrst, Qmap, producing a map, the
second, QFset, a set of features (more complex examples can
be found in [2]):
• Qmap : ﬁnd all the map objects representing the ’MI-
VE’ railway from Milan to Venice.
σMRailway.Name=′Mi−V E′(I(M rail)).
• QFset : ﬁnd all the counties with more that 100,000
inhabitants.
σCounty.N≥100,000(I(County)). ✷
3. BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE AUTHO-
RIZATION MODEL
The proposed access control model relies on the classi-
cal discretionary model centered on the notion of authoriza-
tion [10]. An authorization is traditionally a tuple (S,O, P ),
where: S is the subject of the authorization, i.e. the entity
beneﬁtting from it, for example a user or group of users; O
is the object, i.e. the logical data structure that needs to be
protected, for example a map; and P is the privilege, i.e. the
kind of operations that can be performed on the object. The
object and the privilege are strictly dependent on the data
model. In our model, additional components, all described
in the following, include the authorization sign, specifying
whether the privilege has to be granted (+) or denied (-);
the authorization type, specifying whether the authorization
can be overridden (weak) or not (strong); the window, i.e.,
a spatial object representing the region of space over which
the authorization can be granted; the query, further restrict-
ing the set of objects over which the privilege is granted or
denied; the grantor, i.e., the user assigning the authorization
to the subject; the grant option, which when true denotes
that the subject itself can further grant the (positive) au-
thorization to other users.
3.1 Subjects and objects
Subjects. Subjects are all users that interact with the sys-
tem. The access control model we are going to present does
not support groups and roles, even if it can be easily ex-
tended to deal with them. In the following, we denote with
U the set of all the users.
Objects. In a TSDM database, both schema, group, and
instance objects have to be protected. Schema objects can
be protected with respect to operations concerning access
to their deﬁnition (metadata). Instance objects can be pro-
tected with respect to selection, deletion, and update. Group
objects can be protected with respect to operations concern-
ing their extensions (insertion, deletion, update, selection).
It is important to note that even if, similarly to the re-
lational context, queries are deﬁned against maps and fea-
ture sets, unlike the relational context, in a geographical
database it is very important to deal with single instances.
Indeed, the spatial representation of a feature can be very
detailed and thus can be of great interest to a speciﬁc user.
In the following, given a TSDM schema S = (E , n(),
DomE(),M,Map()) and its instance I(S) = (I(E), I(M)),
we denote: with OFT and OMT the set of feature types E of
S and the set of map types M, respectively; with OM and
OF the set of maps I(M) and the set of feature sets I(E),
respectively; with OMO and OFE the set of all map objects
of the maps I(M) and the set of all features of the feature
sets I(E), respectively.
3.2 Privileges
Privileges can be classiﬁed according to the object on
which they can be granted (see Table 1). Various privileges
can be assigned on instance objects, corresponding to the
various operations that can be executed on them (selection,
deletion, and update of an instance) and to their spatial
properties (dimension, type of spatial representation). We
call these privileges instance privileges. Instance privileges
can also be assigned on group objects with the following
meaning: an instance privilege p assigned to a group ob-
ject o is propagated, following a precise rule, to the instance
objects belonging to o. An additional privilege is assigned
to group objects, in order to insert a feature into a feature
set or to assign an object to a map (insertion privileges).
Finally, for schema objects, we consider access to their def-
inition as a privilege (schema privileges). In the following,
we denote with P the set of all the privileges.
Example 3. Consider Example 1.
• Privilege selM (1, geo), granted on M rail map, allows
the user to read the geometric representation of the
M rail map objects with dimension 1 (i.e., railways).
• Privilege assignM(0), granted on M rail map, allows
the user to insert a map object of dimension 0 (i.e.,
an accident).
• Privilege updF (2, space) on the County feature type al-
lows the user to update the spatial representation of all
the County features in each map in which they appear
with dimension 2 (i.e, map M admin).
• Privilege insertF on the County feature type allows
the user to create a new instance of the County feature
type (with no spatial extension).
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• Privileges sel schFT and sel schMT , on feature type
Railway and map type M admin, respectively, allow
the user to access the meta data concerning the schema
of Railway feature type and M admin map type, re-
spectively. ✷
According to Table 1, privileges of the form p(d), of the
form p(d, t) with t = alpha, and delF are called spatial priv-
ileges since they allow one to read, delete, or update spatial
information. All the other privileges are non-spatial.
Since not all types of privileges apply to all possible types
of object, we introduce a function, called scope that, taken
a privilege, returns the set of objects to which the privilege
can be assigned. According to Table 1, the main problem
arises with privileges for map objects, since they must be
represented at the layer and the dimension required by the
privilege.
Definition 3 (Privilege scope). Let p ∈ P . The
scope of p, denoted by s(p), is the set of objects deﬁned as
follows (for the meaning of Ox sets and of d and t, see sec-
tion 3.1 and Table 1, respectively):
s(sel schFT ) = OFT s(insertF ) = OF
s(sel schMT ) = OMT s(assignM (d)) = OM
s(selF (d, t)) = s(updF (d, t)) = s(delF ) = OF ∪OFE
s(pM (d)) = OM ∪ {o|o ∈ OMO , dim(o) = d}
s(pM (d, t)) = OM ∪ {o|o = 〈f, geo, top〉 ∈ OMO , dim(o) = d,
t = geo→ o.geo = ⊥, t = top→ o.top = ⊥} ✷
3.3 Authorization sign and type
In the proposed model, positive and negative authoriza-
tions can be speciﬁed (authorization sign). A positive autho-
rization establishes that a subject is authorized for a given
privilege on a given object, whereas a negative authorization
establishes that a subject is denied access to a given object
under a given privilege. Thus, a subject u may be denied
access to object o because either u has no authorization on o
or u has a negative authorization on o. We give precedence
to negative authorizations: if u has both a positive and a
negative authorization on o, u is denied access to o.
The authorization type speciﬁes whether an authorization
can be overridden or not. More precisely, weak authoriza-
tions can be overridden by strong authorizations. Weak
and strong authorizations, when combined with authoriza-
tion sign, are a useful mechanism for modeling exceptions.
For example, if user u can update all instances of a given
map m but a certain instance o, we can grant a weak posi-
tive authorization to u for updating m (thus, all instance of
m can be updated by u) and then a negative update autho-
rization on o.
Weak and strong authorizations can also be deﬁned for
instance and schema objects, as well as on group objects and
insertion privileges. Even if authorizations for such objects
and privileges are not propagated, the authorization type
can be used to give precedence to positive authorizations
with respect to negative ones, as we will see in Section 4.
3.4 Queries and windows
In order to specify authorizations for subsets of group ob-
ject extensions, content-based access control is provided by
specifying a TSDM query as part of authorizations. The
query restricts the set of objects to which the authoriza-
tion applies. The query can be speciﬁed for all privileges
aﬀecting objects already existing in the database.
In order to spatially restrict the assignment of new ob-
jects to a map, we also introduce the concept of window
as the region that the assigned objects must intersect. We
deﬁne a window as an object belonging to the TSDM geo-
metric domain Dpolygons. Thus, it consists of a (collection)
of simple polygons with no holes. Note that windows can
be useful also for spatial instance privileges. However, since
they apply to existing objects, in those cases the eﬀect of
the window can be obtained by specifying a query contain-
ing a map selection operator. For the sake of usability, both
modalities are allowed in the model. When both of them
are present, the authorization is applied to all the objects of
the query result, intersecting the window.
3.5 Authorization grantor and grant option
The grantor is the subject that granted the authoriza-
tion. Likewise the classical authorization models, we assume
that a subject can delegate the administration of the autho-
rization to some other subject. The mechanism used for
delegating such functions is that of the grant option. The
grant option is expressed as a Boolean variable; if it is true,
the subject is authorized to grant/revoke the authorization
to/from other subjects. The grant option is speciﬁed only
for positive authorizations; negative authorizations cannot
be delegated.
4. THE GEOGRAPHIC ACCESS CONTROL
MODEL
In our access control model, an authorization is a tuple
containing all the components introduced in Section 3. Not
all possible tuples, however, represent authorizations. In-
deed, tuple components must satisfy some properties de-
pending on the object and the privilege they consider. First
of all, the object must belong to the privilege scope. More-
over, authorizations admit the speciﬁcation of the window
and the query components only for group objects. More
precisely, the window can be speciﬁed only for spatial priv-
ileges (either instance or insertion privileges). The query,
for instance privileges, is an expression of the TSDM query
language returning a subset of the group object extension.
For insertion privileges, the query does not seem reasonable.
However, when assigning objects to a map, it could be use-
ful to restrict the privilege to objects with a certain feature
type. To model this requirement, the query component of
such authorizations is extended to represent a speciﬁc fea-
ture type.
Definition 4 (Authorization). An authorization is
a tuple of the form 〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q〉, where:
• u ∈ U , p ∈ P , pt ∈ {+,−}, g ∈ U , go ∈ {true, false},
o ∈ O ∩ s(p), t ∈ {st, wk}, w ∈ Dpolygons ∪ {}, q is
either a query expressed in the TSDM query language
having o as a parameter or q = ⊥ or q is a feature
type; w =  represents the overall space whereas q = ⊥
represents the identity query, i.e. the query that takes
an object and returns the object itself.
• if o is an instance or schema object, w =  and q = ⊥;
• if o is a group object, p is a spatial instance privilege,
w ∈ Dpolygons ∪ {} and q(o) ⊆ o;
• if o is a group object, p is a non-spatial instance priv-
ilege, w =  and q(o) ⊆ o;
86
Privilege Description
Object: Feature types
sel schFT
It provides the access to feature type schema information, i.e., information concerning descriptive attributes
of the considered feature type.
Object: Feature sets (Feature type extensions)
insertF Ability to insert a new feature, instance of the considered feature type.
Object: Features
selF (d, t)
d ∈ {0, 1, 2,⊥}, t ∈ {geo, top, alpha} ∪ schema(ft).
Ability to read information of type t for the considered feature of feature type ft. If t ∈ {geo, top},
selection is provided in all the maps in which the feature appears with the layer of representation t and
with dimension d. If t = alpha, d = ⊥ (it is not relevant) and selection is provided on all the alphanumeric
attributes of the feature. If t ∈ schema(ft), d = ⊥ and selection is provided on attribute t of the feature.
updF (d, t)
d ∈ {0, 1, 2,⊥}, t ∈ {space, alpha} ∪ schema(ft).
Ability to update information of type t for the considered feature. If t is space, update is provided on the
geometric representation of the feature in all the maps in which it appears with dimension d. If t = alpha,
d = ⊥ and update is provided on all the alphanumeric attributes of the feature. If t ∈ schema(ft), d = ⊥
and update is provided on attribute t of the feature.
delF
Ability to delete the considered feature. As a side eﬀect, the feature is deleted also from all the
maps it has been assigned to.
Object: Map types
sel schMT
It provides the access to schema information for the considered map type, i.e., information concerning the
dimension of a feature type representation inside the map with the considered map type.
Object: Maps (Map type extensions)
assignM (d)
d ∈ {0, 1, 2}
Ability to assign a feature to a map (i.e., to insert a map object) with dimension d, inserting spatial
information inside at least one layer of the map.
Object: Map objects
selM (d, t)
d ∈ {0, 1, 2}, t ∈ {geo, top}.
Ability to read spatial information at layer t and dimension d for the considered map object, that must
have dimension d (otherwise, the privilege is not considered).
updM (d)
d ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Ability to update the spatial information for the considered map object, that must have dimension d
(otherwise, the privilege is not considered).
delM (d)
d ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Ability to delete a certain map object, that must have dimension d (otherwise, the privilege is not consid-
ered). Note that after a deletion the feature still exists but it is no more assigned to the considered map
object.
Legenda: schema(ft): schema of the feature type the considered feature is an instance of.
Table 1: Privileges
• if o is a feature set and p = insertF , w =  and
q = ⊥;
• if o is a map and p = assignM(d) q = ⊥ or q is a
feature type identiﬁer.
Given an authorization a, we use the dot notation to identify
authorization components. ✷
Example 4. Let W be a set of authorization windows (for
the sake of readability, windows are identiﬁed by names):
W = {Milan MetroArea,Milan City, Sesto County}.
Consider the authorizations sets presented in Figure 2.
The authorization set A authorizes Bob (grantor=SA,
where SA stands for Security Administrator) to: (a1): read
the schema of the feature type Railway; (a2): read alphanu-
meric information concerning Railway features; (a3): read
the geometry of M rail map objects intersecting Milan
MetroArea (window restriction); (a4, a5): update the spa-
tial representation of Accident features due to “wrong
manouevre” in any map (a4) except those intersecting the
window Sesto County (a5) (note that this behavior is possi-
ble since a4 is a positive authorization and a5 is a negative
one); (a6): insert new Accident features; (a7): insert map
objects representing the spatial location of Accident features
in the M rail map.
The authorization set B authorizes Ted (grantor=Bob)
to: (a8): read the geometry of M rail map objects inter-
secting Milan City (window restriction); (a9): update the
spatial representation of Accident features due to “wrong
manouevre” and of name “X”, only inside the window
Milan City (window restriction).
The authorization set C authorizes Ted (grantor=Bob) to
read the geometry of M rail map objects with no window
restriction (a10). ✷
Authorization 〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q〉 states that g has
granted u (denied if pt = −) privilege p on a set of objects,
depending on o, p, w, and q. We call these objects authoriza-
tion extension. Due to the complexity of the map model, the
deﬁnition of the authorization extension simpliﬁes the deﬁ-
nition of access control mechanisms. The deﬁnition uses the
concept of privilege scope, introduced in Deﬁnition 3.
Definition 5 (Authorization extension). Let a =
〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q〉. The authorization extension of a,
denoted by ext(a), is the set of objects deﬁned as follows:
• if o is a map object or a schema object, ext(a) = {o};
• if o is a feature set and p is a non-spatial privilege,
ext(a) = {o′|o′ ∈ q(o)};
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SET A ={ a1 = 〈Bob, sel schFT ,+, SA, true,Railway, st,,⊥〉,
a2 = 〈Bob, selF (⊥, alpha),+, SA, false,Railway, st,,⊥〉,
a3 = 〈Bob, selM (2, geo),+, SA, true,M rail, st,Milan MetroArea,⊥〉,
a4 = 〈Bob, updF (0, space),+, SA, true,Accident, wk,, σN=′wrong manouevre′(Accident)〉,
a5 = 〈Bob, updM (0, space),−, SA, false,M rail, st, Sesto County,⊥〉,
a6 = 〈Bob, insertF ,+, SA, true,Accident, st,,⊥〉,
a7 = 〈Bob, assignM (0),+, SA, true,M rail, st,, Accident〉}
SET B = {a8 = 〈Ted, selM (2, geo),+, Bob, false,M rail, st,Milan City,⊥〉,
a9 = 〈Ted, updF (0, space),+, Bob, false,Accident, wk,Milan City,
σN=′wrong manouevre′ ∧ Name=′X′(Accident)〉}
SET C = {a10 = 〈Ted, selM (2, geo),+, Bob, false,M rail, st,,⊥〉 }
Figure 2: Some authorization sets
• if o is a feature and p is a non-spatial privilege, ext(a) =
{o};
• if o is a feature set or a feature and p is a spatial
privilege, ext(a) = {mo|o′ ∈ q(o), ∃m ∈ OM , mo =
〈o′.ao, geo, top〉 ∈ m, mo ∈ s(C(p)), mo Intersect w},1
where C(p) converts p in the corresponding privilege
over map objects:2 C(selF (d, t)) = selM (d, t), where
t = alpha; C(updF (d, space)) = updM (d),
C(delF ) = delM(2).
The extension in this case coincides with the subset of
map objects corresponding to a spatial representation
of the correct type (i.e., in the scope of C(p)) of at least
one feature in q(o), intersecting the window w;
• if o is a map type and p is an instance privilege, ext(a) =
{o′|o′ ∈ q(o), o′ ∈ s(p), o′ Intersect w}, i.e., the ex-
tension coincides with the subset of objects in q(o) and
in the scope of p, intersecting w;
• if o is a group object and p is an insertion privilege,
ext(a) = {o}. ✷
Given a set of authorizations, two properties must be sat-
isﬁed. The ﬁrst, minimality, imposes that the window and
the query be unique for the authorization granted by g to
subject s with grant option go, on object o, with privilege
p, privilege type pt, and type t. Therefore, if an authoriza-
tion has to be speciﬁed on disjoint regions, the authorization
window should be speciﬁed as a collection of disjoint poly-
gons (an admitted value of Dpolygons). The second, grant
safety, speciﬁes how the presence of a window constrains the
authorizations that can be granted by u. More precisely, au-
thorizations with grant option (go = true) can be granted
to other users only if pt = + and the window of the granted
authorizations is contained in the corresponding windows
of the grantor. We also assume that the Security Admin-
istrator (SA) can grant all possible authorizations, without
constraints. Sets of rules satisfying previous properties de-
ﬁne a correct authorization set.
1Intersect is equivalent to Touch ∨ Overlap ∨ In ∨
Contains, and represents the not empty intersection condi-
tion.
2Note that when there are diﬀerent choices when converting
a privilege over a feature in a privilege over a map object,
the less restrictive choice is chosen. For example, delF is
converted into delM (2), which is less restrictive than delM (1)
and delM(0) (see Section 5.1.2).
Definition 6 (Correct authorization set). Let A
be a set of authorizations. A is a correct authorization set
(CAS) if the following properties are satisﬁed:
• Minimality:  ∃a1, a2 ∈ A such that a1.u = a2.u, a1.o =
a2.o, a1.p = a2.p, a1.pt = a2.pt, a1.g = a2.g, a1.t =
a2.t, a1.go = a2.go, and ( a1.w = a2.w or a1.q = a2.q);
• Grant safety: Let a1 ∈ A, a1.pt = +, a1.go = true.
Let qa1 = ∪{q|a ∈ A, a = 〈a1.u, a1.p,+, g, true,
a1.o, a1.t, w, q〉}3 and wa1 = ∪{w|a ∈ A, a = 〈a1.u,
a1.p,+, g, true, a1.o, a1.t, w, q〉}. Then, ∀a2 ∈ A such
that a2 = 〈u, a1.p,+, a1.u, go, a1.o, a1.t, w, q〉 we must
have q ⊆ qa14 and (w In wa1 or w Equal wa1). ✷
Note that verifying whether an authorization set is correct
requires to check all pairs of authorizations, thus, if n is the
cardinality of the set, the complexity is in O(n2).
Example 5. Consider the authorization sets presented in
Example 4. The authorization set A ∪ B is a CAS. Indeed,
minimality is obviously satisﬁed. Moreover, a8 has been
granted by Bob to Ted from authorization a3, queries in a3
and a8 are not speciﬁed and (Milan City In
Milan MetroArea) is true. Additionally, a9 has been
granted by Bob to Ted from authorization a4, the query in
a9 is a reﬁnement of the query in a4, and the window in a9
is obviously contained in the window in a4, which coincides
with the overall space. Thus, grant safety is satisﬁed. On the
other hand, A∪C does not represent a CAS since, although
Bob has the grant option on a3, the condition on windows
is not satisﬁed: ( In Milan MetroArea) is not true. ✷
5. AUTHORIZATION CONTROL MECHA-
NISM
Given a CAS A, the aim of the authorization control
mechanism is to determine whether to grant or reject an
access request according to what has been speciﬁed in A. In
general, an access request is a triple 〈u, p, o〉 stating that a
user u wants to exercise privilege p on object o. In order to
check the request, we must consider which other authoriza-
tions can be derived from the ones in A. This is achieved
by deﬁning speciﬁc derivation rules.
In the following, we ﬁrst present derivation rules and we
formally deﬁne the authorization base. Then, we show how
the authorization base can be used to answer access requests.
3∪ on {q1, ..., qn} produces as result the query expression
q1 ∪ ... ∪ qn.
4A query q1 is contained in another query q2 if for any
database D, q1(D) ⊆ q2(D).
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FEATUREMAP OBJECT
MAP FEATURE SET
(a)
select  (d,GEO)
X
X
select  (d,TOPO)
X
X
select  (2,L)
select  (1,L)
select  (0,L)
X
update  (2,L)
update  (1,L)
F
F
update  (0,L)
F
M
M
M
update  (2)
update  (1)
update  (0)
update  (d,TOPO)
F
update  (d,GEO)
F
M
M
M
delete  (0)
delete  (1)
delete  (2)
(b)
Figure 3: Relationships between (a) objects and (b)
privileges (← represents <)
5.1 Derivation rules
Given a CAS A, other authorizations can be derived from
those in A. Derivation between authorizations can be spec-
iﬁed by using derivation rules. Given an authorization hav-
ing a certain form, each derivation rule speciﬁes which other
authorizations are implied by it. When this happens, we say
that authorization a2 is derived from authorization a1, de-
noted by a2 ← a1.
Two diﬀerent groups of derivation rules can be identiﬁed,
depending on whether the derivation considers relationships
between objects or relationships between privileges. In the
following, both groups of authorizations are described.
5.1.1 Derivation over object relationships
Among the objects deﬁned in Section 3.1, it is possible to
deﬁne some relationships such as if an authorization a exists
for object o1 and there exists a relationship between o1 and
another object o2, a is propagated from o1 to o2. The con-
sidered relationships between objects are graphically repre-
sented in Figure 3(a). Authorizations should be propagated
from group objects to their instances. Moreover, because of
the logical binding between a feature and its spatial repre-
sentation in one or more map objects inside maps, autho-
rizations for map objects can be derived from authorizations
for features. This can be useful, for instance, when we want
to grant a user the privilege to access the spatial represen-
tation of the instances of a certain feature type.
Next rule speciﬁes derivation between group objects and
their instances.
Rule 1. Let o ∈ O be a group object. Let a = 〈u, p, pt, g,
go, o, t, w, q〉 be an authorization such that p is an instance
privilege. Then, for each o′ ∈ ext(a) the following rule holds:
〈u, p, pt, g, go, o′, t,,⊥〉 ← 〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q〉.
Next rule speciﬁes derivation between features and map
objects. This derivation applies only to privileges for map
objects, i.e., those involving spatial representations.
Rule 2. Let a = 〈u, p, pt, g, go, f, t,,⊥〉 be an autho-
rization such that p is a spatial instance privilege and f is a
feature. Then, for each o′ ∈ ext(a), the following rule holds:
〈u,C(p), pt, g, go, o′, t,,⊥〉 ← 〈u, p, pt, g, go, f, t,,⊥〉
where function C generates the privilege corresponding to p
over map objects (see Deﬁnition 5).
Example 6. Let Milan be a feature of County type and
mo = M admin(Milan) the map object inside the map
M admin representing the spatial extension of the feature
Milan. The following are some examples of derivation rules
over object relationships:
〈B, selF (2, geo),+, A, true,Milan, st,,⊥〉 ←
〈B, selF (2, geo),+, A, true, County, st,,⊥〉
〈B, selM (2, geo),+, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉 ←
〈B, selF (2, geo),+, A, true,Milan, st,,⊥〉
According to the previous rules, a select privilege selF (2, geo)
on the feature type County is propagated, due to Rule 1,
from County to the feature Milan and, due to Rule 2,
from selF (2, geo) on the feature Milan to the map object
M admin(Milan) as selM (2, geo). ✷
5.1.2 Derivation over privilege relationships
Due to the nature of spatial objects, additional derivation
rules can be deﬁned in order to take into account object di-
mension and spatial layer. Such information are contained
in the granted privileges. The most informative layer is
certainly the geometric one, since topological information
can be computed from it but the converse is not true. Thus,
it seems reasonable to assume that an authorization grant-
ing a privilege for the geometric layer has to be propagated
to the topological layer. On the other hand, an authoriza-
tion denying a privilege for the topological layer has to be
propagated to the geometric one.
Similar rules can be deﬁned by considering object dimen-
sion. Indeed, an authorization granting a privilege to objects
with a certain dimension has to be propagated to objects
with lower dimension (e.g., if a user can select regions, he
can also select lines and points). On the other hand, an
authorization denying a privilege to objects with a certain
dimension has to be propagated to objects with higher di-
mension (e.g., if a user cannot select points, it cannot select
neither lines nor regions).
In order to formally introduce derivations between privi-
leges, we introduce a partial order < among them. We say
that p1 < p2 if and only if: (i) p1 = p
′
1(d1, t1), p2 = p
′
2(d2, t2)
and either (t1 = geo and t2 = top) or (t1 = t2 and d1 < d2);
(ii) p1 = p
′
1(d1), p2 = p
′
2(d2) and d1 < d2 (see Figure 3(b)).
Next rule formally speciﬁes derivations based on such priv-
ilege ordering. Note that the rule can be applied only to
objects belonging to the scope of the derived privilege.
Rule 3. Let p1 ∈ P, p2 ∈ P such that p1 < p2 and o ∈
s(p1) ∩ s(p2). The following rules hold:
〈u, p1,+, g, go, o, t, w, q〉 ← 〈u, p2,+, g, go, o, t, w, q〉
〈u, p2,−, g, go, o, t, w, q〉 ← 〈u, p1,−, g, go, o, t, w, q〉.
Example 7. The following are some examples of deriva-
tion rules over privilege relationships:
a1 = 〈B, selM(2, top),+, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉 ←
〈B, selM (2, geo),+, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉
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a2 = 〈B, selM (1, geo),+, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉 ←
〈B, selM (2, geo),+, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉
a3 = 〈B, selM (1, geo),−, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉 ←
〈B, selM (1, top),−, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉
a4 = 〈B, selM (2, top),−, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉 ←
〈B, selM (1, top),−, A, true,mo, st,,⊥〉
According to the previous derivation rules and to Rule 3, a
select privilege selM (2, geo) on the map object mo is propa-
gated as selM(2, top) (authorization a1) and as selM(1, geo)
(a2). Moreover, the privilege selM (1, top) is propagated as
selM (1, geo) (a3) and as selM (2, top) (a4). ✷
5.2 Algorithms for access control
Given a CAS A, based on the derivation rules presented
above, we can now deﬁne the authorization base as the set
of authorizations contained in A extended with those de-
rived from A. The construction of the authorization base
guarantees that it represents a correct authorization set.
Definition 7 (Authorization Base). Let A be a CAS.
Let
∗← denote the transitive closure of ←. Let A+ be deﬁned
as {a|a ∈ A or ∃a′ ∈ A a ∗← a′}. The authorization base
AB(A) for A is deﬁned as {〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q〉 |〈u, p,
pt, g, go, o, t, w′, q′〉 ∈ A+, w = ∪{wi|〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, wi,
qi〉 ∈ A+}, q = ∪{qi| 〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, t,wi, qi〉 ∈ A+}}. ✷
Proposition 1. If A be a CAS, AB(A) is a CAS.
Proof Sketch: By construction, minimality is satisﬁed
by AB(A). Note that minimality may not be satisﬁed by
A+. This happens for example when A contains an autho-
rization with privilege p(2, l) and one with privilege p(1, l).
When applying derivation rules, a new authorization with
privilege p(1, l) is generated that may violate minimality.
Grant safety can be proved by contradiction by observing
that derivation rules do not change users, grantors, grant
option, authorization sign and type, queries and windows.
Thus, if grant safety is not satisﬁed by the authorization
base, it cannot be satisﬁed by A but this contradicts the
hypothesis. ✷
The following proposition gives an estimated of the com-
plexity of computing the authorization base and of its car-
dinality.
Proposition 2. Let A be a CAS and AB(A) the corre-
sponding authorization base. Let na be the number of autho-
rizations in A. Let a ∈ A such that a.o is a group object.
Let na,o be the cardinality of a.o extension. Let nm be the
number of maps in the database and no = max{na,o|a ∈ A}.
Assuming that nm <<< no, the cardinality of AB(A) is lin-
ear in na and no. The number of authorizations derived from
a is linear in na,o. The complexity of constructing AB(A)
is quadratic in na and no.
Proof Sketch: The proof follows from the following con-
siderations: (i) The longest derivation can be obtained by
considering authorizations on group objects or features (oth-
erwise Rules 1 and 2 are not used). (ii) Given an authoriza-
tion a such that a.o is a group object or a feature, the longest
derivation starting from a is obtained by ﬁrst applying Rule
3 to a. According to Figure 3, this can be done at most 3
times. Then, if a.o is a group object, Rule 1 can be applied
once for each object belonging to the extension of a.o, which
is lower than or equal to no. If a.o is a feature, Rule 2 can be
applied at most once for each map object corresponding to
a.o. Since maps are at most nm, the number of map objects
is at most equal to nm. (iii) From the previous considera-
tion, since we assume that nm <<< no, it follows that from
each authorization a we can generate at most 3na,o autho-
rizations. Thus, from A, we can generate at most 3nona
authorizations. Thus, the cardinality of AB(A) is linear in
na and no. (iv) On the other hand, in order to construct
AB(A), windows have to be combined, thus, each autho-
rization in the set has to be compared with all the others.
Thus, the complexity is quadratic in na and no. ✷
Example 8. Consider the geographical database described
in Example 1. Let Bob be a user, having only the following
two authorizations:
a = 〈Bob, selM (2, geo),+, Ann, true,M rail, st,,⊥〉
b = 〈Bob, selF (1, top),−, Ann, true,Railway, st,,⊥〉
In M rail, Railway instances have dimension 1, Accident
instances have dimension 0, no object with dimension 2 ex-
ists. Moreover, both Railway and Accident features admit
both a geometric and topological representation. Thus, from
a, we can derive the following authorizations:
a1 = 〈Bob, selM (1, geo),+, Ann, true,M rail, st,,⊥〉, by
applying Rule 3 to a.
a2 = 〈Bob, selM (0, geo),+, Ann, true,M rail, st,,⊥〉, by
applying Rule 3 to a or to a1.
a3 = 〈Bob, selM (2, top),+, Ann, true,M rail, st,,⊥〉, by
applying Rule 3 to a.
a4 = 〈Bob, selM (1, top),+, Ann, true,M rail, st,,⊥〉, by
applying Rule 3 to a3.
a5 = 〈Bob, selM (0, top),+, Ann, true,M rail, st,,⊥〉, by
applying Rule 3 to a4 or a3.
ai1 = 〈Bob, selM (1, geo),+,Ann, true, i, st,,⊥〉, where i ∈
{y|y ∈ M rail ∧ y represents a Railway feature }; these au-
thorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to a1.
ai2 = 〈Bob, selM (0, geo),+,Ann, true, i, st,,⊥〉, where i ∈
{y|y ∈ M rail ∧ y represents an Accident feature }; these
authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to a2.
ai4 = 〈Bob, selM (1, top),+, Ann, true, i, st,,⊥〉, where i ∈
{y|y ∈ M rail ∧ y represents a Railway feature }; these au-
thorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to a4.
ai5 = 〈Bob, selM (0, top),+, Ann, true, i, st,,⊥〉, where i ∈
{y|y ∈ M rail ∧ y represents an Accident feature }; these
authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to a5.
¿From b, we get the following authorizations:
b1 = 〈Bob, selF (2, top),−, Ann, true,Railway, st,,⊥〉, by
applying Rule 3 to b.
b2 = 〈Bob, selF (1, geo),−, Ann, true,Railway, st,,⊥〉, by
applying Rule 3 to b.
b3 = 〈Bob, selF (2, geo),−, Ann, true,Railway, st,,⊥〉, by
applying Rule 3 to b2 or b1.
bi2 = 〈Bob, selF (1, geo),−, Ann, true, i, st,,⊥〉, where i rep-
resents a Railway feature; these authorizations are obtained
by applying Rule 1 to b2.
bi = 〈Bob, selF (1, top),−, Ann, true, i, st,,⊥〉, where i rep-
resents a Railway feature; these authorizations are obtained
by applying Rule 1 to b.
b
′i
2 = 〈Bob, selM(1, geo),−, Ann, true, i, st,,⊥〉, where i ∈
{y|y ∈ M rail ∧ y represents a Railway feature }; these au-
thorizations are obtained by applying Rule 2 to bi2.
b
′i = 〈Bob, selM (1, top),−, Ann, true, i, st,,⊥〉, where i ∈
{y|y ∈ M rail ∧ y represents a Railway feature }; these au-
thorizations are obtained by applying Rule 2 to bi. ✷
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Given an access request r = 〈u, p, o〉, stating that a user u
wants to exercise privilege p on object o, and a CAS A, the
problem arises of establishing whether the request can or
cannot be satisﬁed and on which set of objects. To this pur-
pose, the authorization base is used. More precisely, given
an authorization a, we say that r = 〈u, p, o〉 depends on a
if and only if a = 〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q〉, i.e., a grants or
deny privilege p to u over object o. According to what we
presented in Section 4, the access request can be satisﬁed if
and only if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. r depends on a strong positive authorization and on
no strong negative authorizations;
2. r depends on a weak positive authorization, on no
weak negative authorizations, and on no strong au-
thorizations.
In all the other cases, the access has to be denied. This
means that, in presence of strong authorizations, weak ones
are not considered. For both weak and strong authoriza-
tions, negative authorizations have precedence with respect
to positive ones.
Definition 8. Let A be a CAS and r = 〈u, p, o〉 be an
access request. r is satisﬁed in A if and only if one of the
following condition holds:
• ∃ 〈u, p,+, g, go, o, st,w, q〉 ∈ AB(A) and
 ∃ 〈u, p,−, g, go, o, st, w, q〉 ∈ AB(A) ;
• ∃ 〈u, p,+, g, go, o, wk,w, q〉 ∈ AB(A),
 ∃ 〈u, p,−, g, go, o, wk,w, q〉 ∈ AB(A) and
 ∃ 〈u, p, pt, g, go, o, st,w, q〉 ∈ AB(A). ✷
If r is satisﬁed in A, we deﬁne O(r) = {o′|o′ is an instance
of o and 〈u, p, o′〉 is satisﬁed in A} as the set of instance
objects over which the privilege is granted. ✷
The complexity of checking an access request depends on
the cardinality of the authorization base. Thus, it is linear
in na and no (see Proposition 2).
Example 9. Consider the authorization base computed
in Example 8. Suppose that Bob makes the following access
request: 〈Bob, selM (1, geo),M rail〉. Since authorizations
b
′i and ai1, as well as b
′i
2 and b
i
4 are all strong but conﬂicting,
and since we give precedence to negation, M rail map ob-
jects corresponding to Railway features cannot be accessed
by Bob. On the other hand, map objects corresponding to
Accident features can be accessed both at the geometric and
topological layer, due to authorizations ai5 ad a
i
2. Now sup-
pose that authorization b (and therefore all the authoriza-
tions derived from b) are weak. In this case, since strong
positive authorizations exist for Railway and Accident map
objects, all of them can be accessed both at the geometric and
topological layer. As a third case, suppose that authorization
a (and therefore all the authorizations derived from a) are
weak. Independently on whether authorization b is weak or
strong, only Accident map objects can be accessed. ✷
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have presented a new access control
model for geographical maps. Our model supports both
positive and negative authorizations, permits inheritance of
the authorizations according to the objects hierarchy and
propagation of authorizations, taking into account object
dimension and type of spatial information.
It is interesting to note that a window assigns an autho-
rization a spatial extent. An authorization thus can be con-
sidered itself an entity with spatial and non spatial proper-
ties and as such it can be modeled as a TSDM feature with
a speciﬁc feature type. Moreover, the set of windows can be
represented in TSDM as an authorization map. As a result,
a uniform model is applied for representing and querying
application data and authorizations.
As part of future work, we plan to develop eﬃcient tech-
niques for authorization administration and for access con-
trol enforcement, based on the use of logic programming
techniques. An additional issue we plan to investigate con-
cerns the development of similar access control models for
GIS standards [8].
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